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As the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic keeps claiming human lives and ravaging the
global economy, governments, businesses and individuals have turned to digital technologies
to both contain the virus and adapt to the ‘new normal’. To interrupt the chain of transmission
more effectively, numerous contact-tracing apps - which notify people that they have been in
close proximity with COVID-19 carriers - have been rolled out globally. Restaurants, pubs
and hospitality businesses have embraced a multitude of mobile apps allowing customers to
book tables, place orders and make payments remotely and without human contact, in a move
to protect their staff and facilitate social distancing. In response to lockdown measures, people
have flocked to the Internet to work, conduct business, stay close with friends and relatives,
find entertainment and more. In fact, Facebook, Amazon and YouTube have reportedly low-
ered the quality of video streaming in Europe to reduce the strain on Internet networks,1 and
companies like Netflix and Zoom have experienced dramatic growth.2
In this context of expanding datafication of our health and every other aspect of our lives,
the COVID-19 pandemic has stress tested not only our healthcare infrastructure but also the
soundness of Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) following its entry into
force about two years ago. Two important trends can be discerned from this test. First, ob-
1Mark Beech, ‘COVID-19 Pushes Up Internet Use 70% And Streaming More Than 12%, First Fig-
ures Reveal’ (Forbes)https://www.forbes.com/sites/markbeech/2020/03/25/covid-19-pushes-up-internet-use-70-
streaming-more-than-12-first-figures-reveal/.
2Dominic Rushe and Benjamin Lee, ‘Netflix Doubles Expected Tally of New Subscribers amid Covid-19 Lock-
down’ (the Guardian, 21 April 2020) http://www.theguardian.com/media/2020/apr/21/netflix-new-subscribers-
covid-19-lockdown; Iman Ghosh, ‘Zoom Is Now Worth More Than the World’s 7 Biggest Airlines’ (Visual Cap-
italist, 15 May 2020) https://www.visualcapitalist.com/zoom-boom-biggest-airlines/.
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servance of the GDPR has overall impeded the deployment of excessively invasive contact-
tracing-based surveillance to contain the virus. Second, as we increase reliance on digital
technologies during the pandemic, it becomes virtually impossible to prevent more aspects of
our lives from being intensively monitored by both established big tech firms and a growing
number of private actors. These two trends combined reveal a transparency and accountabil-
ity gap between the public and the private sector which warrant innovative solutions to uphold
our fundamental rights to privacy and protection of personal data.
The GDPR has kept contract-tracing-based surveillance in check
In countries with low data protection standards, contact-tracing apps typically gather highly
sensitive data, including location data and biometrics.3 This data is then sent to a centralised
server, oftentimes located in government offices. This data can be subsequently paired with
existing public and corporate datasets, thus revealing intimate details of people’s lives, even
providing grounds for discrimination. In addition to ignoring privacy-by-design standards,
most of these apps are closed source, which means they do not allow for third-party review or
security audits.4 Access to individuals’ data by government agencies, as well as aggregation
of diverse datasets and data-sharing between governments and private companies, commonly
takes place with little to no oversight or transparency.
Conversely, in the early days of the pandemic the European Commission and the European
Data Protection Board issued guidelines on the GDPR-compliant development of COVID-
19 apps and associated initiatives.5 These bodies largely promoted individuals’ control over
personal data (by requiring that the adoption of COVID-19 apps be voluntary),6 sought to
avoid the undue identification and tracking of individuals (based on requirements that only
minimal, necessary and/or anonymised data be processed),7 and generally ensured that any
emergency restrictions on individual freedoms be proportionate and limited to the emergency
period.8
3See examples of contact-tracing apps in Bahrain, China, Ecuador, India, Russia, Singapore, Turkey and more
countries in Freedom House, ‘Freedom on the NET 2020: The Pandemic’s Digital Shadow’ (2020) 15 et seq.
4ibid 15.
5European Commission, ‘Commission Recommendation on a Common Union Toolbox for the Use of Tech-
nology and Data to Combat and Exit from the COVID-19 Crisis, in Particular Concerning Mobile Applications
and the Use of Anonymised Mobility Data’; European Commission, ‘Guidance on Apps Supporting the Fight
against COVID-19 Pandemic in Relation to Data Protection C(2020) 2523 Final’; EDPB, ‘Guidelines 04/2020 on
the Use of Location Data and Contact Tracing Tools in the Context of the COVID-19 Outbreak’.
6European Commission (n 5) 3; EDPB (n 5) 7.
7European Commission (n 5) 8–9; EDPB (n 5) 4–7.
8European Commission (n 5) 6; EDPB (n 5) 8.
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The majority of EU Member States’ Data Protection Authorities (DPAs) have been ac-
tively involved in the development and implementation of COVID-19 apps and other data-
driven measures to tackle the crisis, issuing recommendations and discussing bills introducing
derogations from data protection safeguards.9
Following the aforementioned guidelines and recommendations, most EU countries have
launched government-backed COVID-19 apps built on privacy-preserving architectures which
use a Bluetooth low energy connection to automatically detect and trace all COVID-19 con-
tacts of handheld device users, estimating their proximity on the basis of signal intensity.10
Bluetooth proximity data has a privacy advantage over GPS-based data because the only in-
formation it involves is anonymised contact tokens, which can be cryptographically secured in
a way that is less vulnerable to de-anonymisation than location history.11 The great majority
of government-supported contact-tracing apps implemented in the EU do not collect GPS-
based data.12 Instead, they process only Bluetooth proximity data, typically based on the
decentralised Google-Apple Exposure Notification API.13 In this way, the potential for mis-
sion creep during and after the pandemic are ameliorated, and an adequate balance between
EU residents’ data privacy and the public interest is struck.
The GDPR remains inadequate to curb private sector surveillance
The pandemic has multiplied the scenarios where our consent to multiple forms of opaque
and unwarranted data processing and sharing is forcefully extracted, thereby compounding
the risks that our digital identity - largely constructed without our involvement or approval -
be relied upon to make decisions contrary to our interests.
For example, imagine you want to have a meal in your local pub (when restrictions are
relaxed). Upon entering the premises, you realise there is no ‘traditional’ customer service;
rather, you need to download a booking and payment app, entering personal details to register.
However, registration cannot be completed - and therefore you cannot be served - until you
9See generally European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, ‘Coronavirus Pandemic in the EU - Funda-
mental Rights Implications: With a Focus on Contact-Tracing Apps / Bulletin 2’ (2020) 46–51.
10Matteo Ciucci and Gouardères Frédéric, ‘Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life
Policies - European Parliament - National COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps’ (2020) PE 652.711 1.
11Vi Hart and others, ‘Outpacing the Virus: Digital Response to Containing the Spread of COVID-19 Wile
Mitigating Privacy Risks’ (Edmond J Safra Center for Ethics 2020) 17 https://ethics.harvard.edu/files/center-for-
ethics/files/white_paper_5_outpacing_the_virus_final.pdf?m=1586179217.
12See updated list in Sheet ‘Contact Tracing Apps: Overview’ at https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/
1enCBRLVCo2Dp2B0AB3tEYvLc279i5LUuoGCzoelz8aQ/editgid=2010667918
13For an overview of this protocol see ICO, ‘Opinion: Apple and Google Joint Initiative on COVID-19 Contact
Tracing Technology’ (2020) Reference 2020/01.
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tick a box signalling acceptance to terms and conditions that allow for extensive collection of
personal data for multiple purposes unrelated to the transaction you had in mind (i.e. having
a simple meal). This type of consent is clearly invalid under the GDPR. Yet, without the
competent DPA actually finding and penalising the breach, consent obtained in this way is
‘fair game’. Data hoovered from your frequent visits to the pub can lead to predictions of
a medical condition based on inferred alcohol consumption, ultimately resulting in a more
expensive health insurance premium.
Moreover, as we are forced to conduct most of our activities online, the likes of Facebook,
Google and Amazon have more of our attention - and therefore more of our personal data. As
a result, they get even better at permanently assessing, categorising and ultimately nudging
us into acting in a given way, such as clicking on an ad, registering for a service, purchasing
a product, viewing specific content, and even voting for a certain political candidate. Conse-
quently, we are turned into Pavlovian dogs of the digital age, unaware of both the manipulation
that takes place online and the underlying privacy invasions that enable it.
In spite of the GDPR’s stringent consent standards and expanded transparency require-
ments, we remain unable to make informed choices about data processing and exercise mean-
ingful control over our personal data.
Halting private sector surveillance warrants innovative solutions
The adequacy of the EU data protection framework to resist digital surveillance by states and
its inadequacy to prevent the same practice by private actors is explained by a transparency
and accountability deficit in the private sector. Overall, EU Member States’ institutionality
and democratic processes involve suitable ‘checks and balances’ against disproportionate state
surveillance initiatives. Although non-binding, governments normally follow the guidance
from EU-level data protection watchdogs and DPAs. A government may be tempted to depart
from these regulators’ recommendations and implement instead more intrusive measures.14 In
these cases, however, scrutiny by and mounting pressure from diverse stakeholders normally
result in their withdrawal.15
14Such as the Norwegian government’s contact-tracing app ‘Smittestopp’, which continuously tracked
and uploaded people’s GPS location onto a national database for half a year. Amnesty Interna-
tional, ‘Bahrain, Kuwait and Norway Contact Tracing Apps a Danger for Privacy’ (16 June 2020
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/06/bahrain-kuwait-norway-contact-tracing-apps-danger-for-
privacy/.
15For example, after criticism by activists, technologies and scholars, the Norwegian DPA imposed a tem-
porary ban on ‘Smittestopp’, ultimately resulting in its permanent demise. Kristin Sandvik, ‘Big Data & So-
ciety: The Norwegian Covid-19 Tracing App Experiment Revisited’ (Big Data & Society, 3 November 2020)
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Conversely, the advent of the digital economy has seen the consolidation of a surveillance
infrastructure featuring a vast universe of private actors, the majority of which seeks to pro-
cess our personal data for financial gain, irrespective of our privacy preferences. Since the
processing of personal data takes place in a ‘black box’, we cannot verify which types of our
personal data is processed, for what purposes, or with whom it is shared – let alone prevent
specific forms of data processing which are increasingly likely to harm us. In addition, being
notoriously under-resourced and understaffed, DPAs16 are increasingly unable to effectively
enforce compliance with data protection law by an overwhelming and growing number of
actors.17 Lack of transparency in data flows coupled with poor law enforcement means that
unlawful private sector surveillance is regularly unpunished. Apart from the very rare occa-
sions when a DPA steps in, controllers have no real incentive to change their lucrative practices
other than the very remote threat of a fine.
Ultimately, just as there is no single effective response against COVID-19, there is no sil-
ver bullet solution to protect our data privacy. Having a robust data protection regulation like
the GDPR is an essential safeguard; however, law on paper becomes meaningless if it is sys-
tematically violated in ways regulators cannot realistically and effectively monitor, detect and
punish. The GDPR must be accompanied by measures capable of correcting the transparency
and accountability deficit in the private sector, and governments’ response to the COVID-19
pandemic might have just hinted a potential approach to this end.
Just as partnerships between public and private actors have been formed to leverage state-
of-the-art mobile technology to determine whether we have been in close proximity to COVID-
19 carriers, similar partnerships can leverage blockchain technology to create a reliable audit
trail of personal data flows and enforce compliance with GDPR rules through ‘smart con-
tracts’.
A blockchain is an append-only database (or ledger)composed of sets (blocks) of cryp-
tographically signed transactions that is shared, synchronised and stored in a decentralised
fashion, based on a consensus algorithm.18 Blockchains provide confidence that stored in-
formation (for example, an account balance, property certificates or data flows) cannot and
http://bigdatasoc.blogspot.com/2020/11/the-norwegian-covid-19-tracing-app.html; Similarly, after strong criti-
cism by privacy advocates, the UK abandoned the NHSX app and developed another one based on Google-Apple
Exposure Notification API. Natasha Singer, ‘Virus-Tracing Apps Are Rife With Problems. Governments Are
Rushing to Fix Them.’ The New York Times (8 July 2020 https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/08/technology/virus-
tracing-apps-privacy.html.
16Johnny Ryan and Alan Toner, ‘Europe’s Governments Are Failing the GDPR - Brave’s 2020 Report on the
Enforcement Capacity of Data Protection Authorities’ (2020).
17Access Now, ‘Two Years under the EU GDPR - An Implementation Progress Report’ (2020) 7.
18See generally Daniel Drescher, Blockchain Basics (Springer 2017).
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has not been tampered with, thus ensuring a ‘single truth’ across different participants which
contribute to maintaining the ledger.
A privacy-preserving blockchain-based stack is being developed in the Privacy-aware
Cloud Ecosystems (PACE) project.19 This privacy-enhancing technology (PET) maps out
and stores all data flows arising from a person’s interaction with a cloud-based service, deny-
ing access to certain kinds of data based on the user’s preferences, and reporting violations
to regulators. Given their potential of increasing much needed transparency in data flows and
affording users control over their personal data at scale, this and other similar PETs are steps
in the right direction to replicate the effect the GDPR has when states attempt disproportionate
intrusions into our data privacy.
19EPSRC: EP/R033439/1
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